Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2012-77

Intellectual Property in the Cathedral

Dan L. Burk
dburk@law.uci.edu

University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law

The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at:

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170093

Intellectual Property in the Cathedral
Dan L. Burk†

Introduction
In this chapter I propose to explore a number of ramifications of the entitlement structure
chosen for intellectual property. Reto Hilty1, echoing theoretical work by Jerry Reichman2 and
others, has called for greater use of the compulsory license in intellectual property systems, a call
with which I concur. Indeed, my only point of disagreement will be that this call is not enough.
My argument will be that liability rules such as the compulsory license are indeed appropriate in
many more instances than we have tended to employ them, but that even this recognition is too
timid. Property theory provides us with a range of possible entitlement constructions, including
the classic property rule and liability rule, but by no means limited to these. I will suggest that
not only liability rules, but several other kinds of related allocation rules, ought to be more
routinely used in intellectual property cases than they have been. While many of my examples
will be drawn from common law remedies, the structure is equally applicable to incorporation
within civil codes, and as I will suggest, administrative process as well.

Exploring the Cathedral
Our exploration of possible entitlement structures begins with the famous Calabresi and
Melamed article on Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral.3 This work has been largely responsible for establishing and defining these terms of
property and liability. Following the Calabresi/Melamed framework, we typically speak of
property rules as conferring on their holders a right to exclude, and liability rules as conferring
on their holders a right to be paid. When speaking of intellectual property as property, we tend
to assume that the entitlement to the subject matter of patent, copyright, trademark and similar
regimes paradigmatically involves the right to exclude. However, liability rules are not unknown
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to such regimes.4 It may be that they should be more common, and if we are serious about
considering the Calabresi/Melamed framework, there are perhaps other rules worth considering
as well.
Calabresi and Melamed were of course speaking generally about almost any system of
entitlement, but here we will focus on the context of an intellectual property entitlement, such as
a patent. We might begin by considering how, when a patent or similar intellectual property
entitlement is disputed, the remedies available to a court adjudicating the dispute could be
structured to treat the entitlement under any of four allocative rules. Under the
Calabresi/Melamed framework, we could characterize the court’s choices as encompassing two
possible reciprocal property rules and two possible reciprocal liability rules, allocating one of
each possible rule to the prevailing party:
Rule 1: the court could find infringement and enjoin the infringing activity.
Rule 2: the court could find infringement but allow the infringer to continue if he pays damages
to the intellectual property holder.
Rule 3: the court could find no infringement and allow the alleged infringer's activity to continue
without paying damages.
Rule 4: the court could find infringement but allow the infringer to continue unless the
intellectual property owner pays damages to the infringer in order to enjoin the infringing
activity.
Following work by Ian Ayres5, we can arrange these entitlement rules into a two by two
matrix, distinguishing them on the one dimension by who holds the entitlement, and on a
perpendicular axis by the type of entitlement: property or liability. Looking at the first column,
in the case of intellectual property, such as a patent, either the patent holder or the alleged
infringer may have the right to use the subject matter of the entitlement, such as a claimed
invention. If the rule allocates this right to the patent holder, she will be able to prevail on a
court to enforce the right by means of an injunction. But if the alleged infringer can show either
non-infringement or validity, he by default holds the right to continue his activities.
The purported advantage of property rules is that they harness private information to
optimize uses of assets such as intellectual property. Under conditions of low transactions costs,
we expect that wherever the exclusive right is allocated, the parties will negotiate for the right so
that whichever party values it the most will pay the other to secure the right. This moves the
right to its highest value use, nicely aligning private preferences with public welfare. Indeed,
under sufficiently low transaction costs, we don’t care who is given the right initially; bargaining
will move it to whichever party values it the most. This is the optimal outcome that free market
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economists, and many naïve law professors, hope and expect will occur under the famous Coase
theorem.6
But Coase’s point in fact was that this condition of low transaction costs is seldom the
case; markets are costly mechanisms for exchange, and transaction costs will frequently impede
the reallocation of the right. And, since our information about optimal outcomes is always
imperfect, we should expect that the right will frequently be placed into the wrong hands, and
could very likely become lodged there. It therefore behooves us to expend some resources to get
the allocation correct in the first instance, since an improper provision may not be selfcorrecting.

However, another possibility besides property is also available. Looking to the second
column, the intellectual property holder may be granted a different remedy, a right to be paid
under a liability rule, such as occurs under a compulsory license. Note that sometimes we may
couch this in slightly different terms; we may give the alleged infringer an affirmative right to
continue his activities, as in the case of prior user rights. That might be characterized as giving
the alleged infringer a Rule 3 property right to continue his activities, but is also effectively a
Rule 2 compulsory license at a zero royalty – which should remind us that these rules sometimes
blend together at the edges, and so the labels we give them are not always crisp and clean.
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Free market enthusiasts worry about liability rules as remedies, because in actual practice
information is imperfect and so someone with imperfect information has to set the rate for the
liability payment.7 A judge or other adjudicator may not set the optimal payment, if that is
defined as the payment that the parties might independently negotiate. But if the transaction
costs to negotiation are high, as we have said, the parties may never reach any agreement,
optimal or otherwise. In cases of high transaction costs, many commentators believe that a
imperfectly calibrated payment may be a better solution than an immovably lodged property
right.

Considering Reverse Liability
However, this does not yet complete our two by two matrix. There is yet an additional
possibility in the liability column, a fourth possible rule. We have considered the possibility of
bestowing a property right on each of the parties, and symmetry suggests that we should do the
same for liability rules. Notice that, as in the case of the property rule, it is equally possible to
assign a reciprocal right to be paid to the alleged infringer rather than to the entitlement holder.
We might call this a reverse liability rule, to distinguish it from the Rule 2 under which the
entitlement holder has a right to be paid. Under Rule 4, the alleged infringer might have a right
to be paid.
American lawyers will recognize this rule as the famous "reverse liability rule" from the
Del Webb v. Spur Industries8 case that is routinely taught in first year property courses. The
Spur Industries case involved a land developer of residential homes who built houses near a
cattle feed lot. Because the feed lot generated dust and offensive smells that affected the
residential housing, the developer sued to abate the nuisance -- essentially, asked the court for an
injunction to close or move the feed lot. The court hearing the case could have chosen Rules 1 or
2 -- that is, could have assigned a property right to one of the parties, either saying that the feed
lot had a right to produce dust and odor, and so denied the injunction, or in the alternative could
have said that the home owners had a right to be free from dust and odor, and so granted the
injunction.
The court instead fashioned a different remedy. It held that the residential developer was
entitled to an injunction, with a caveat. Since the developer had in some sense "come to the
nuisance," putting himself and his purchasers in a position to be affected by the feed lot dust and
smell, the court held that the feed lot should not bear the cost of the move. The developer’s
injunction would be contingent on a payment to the feed lot owner to offset the cost of moving
his operation. In our application of the rule to intellectual property, we would map the developer
and the feed lot onto the patent holder and the infringer. Rather than the entitlement owner –
such as a patent holder -- receiving a payment from the alleged infringer, instead the infringer
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would be entitled to receive the payment if the entitlement owner elects to exercise her exclusive
rights.

Reverse Liability in Intellectual Property
There has been little consideration as to how such a rule might play out in intellectual
property, rather than real property. But one can quickly see possible applications. One of the
major controversies currently surrounding patent law, especially in the United States, is the
problem of non-practicing entities (NPEs) or so-called patent trolls.9 It is difficult to determine
exactly who is a patent troll -- sometimes it seems to be any patent owner that someone else
doesn't like, but they are typically characterized as firms that have acquired a patent, or
sometimes an entire portfolio of patents, not in order to produce an innovative product, but only
to enforce or threaten to enforce the patent to generate a revenue scheme. Sometimes the patents
are obscure, or likely to be found invalid if someone was willing to spend the money to challenge
them. Typically the "NPE" firms have no research or production capacity, so the concern seems
to be that the patents are not facilitating innovation, but only a kind of rent-seeking.
The concern is that a property rule, awarding exclusive rights through the mechanism of
an injunction, gives the "troll" too much leverage. Because the injunction can completely shut
down the infringing party's operations if they are reliant on the patented technology, the
injunctive threat can be equal to the value of their entire business. In the United States, this
concern was partially addressed by the United States Supreme Court decision in eBay vs. Merc
Exchange.10 Prior to this decision, there had been a lower court presumption in favor of an
almost automatic permanent injunction for patent owners who proved their cases against
infringers, on the theory that the right to exclude via an injunction is the essential characteristic
of a property right. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the patent statute authorized
issuance of an injunction on equitable grounds, and a court sitting in equity should consider the
public interest, the adequacy of a legal remedy awarding damages, and the relative hardship of
an injunction on the two parties.
There is empirical evidence that since the eBay decision, the injunctions granted to NPE
patent holders has dropped, while maintaining the availability of injunctions for manufacturing
or active research firms.11 This equitable balancing test is effective in separating innovative
patent holders from those who are seeking only revenue -- in other words, from non-practicing
entities. NPEs who are seeking only to generate a revenue stream are adequately compensated
by damages after a successful law suit, meaning that the injunctive remedy is unnecessary and
perhaps harmful. However, a patent holder who is interested in producing a product, and so
needs exclusivity to clear or structure his market, would likely not be adequately served by
monetary damages, and so should receive the injunction. The rule in effect substitutes a
compulsory license in those cases where the public interest and the balance of the equities
militates against a strict property rule
9
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The use of a liability rule in this instance seems to have been fairly successful. But a
reverse liability rule might be even more successful in dealing with the NPE leverage problem.
Instead of the eBay compulsory licensing liability rule, imagine the application of the Spur
Industries rule: a court sitting in equity might say to the patent holder, you are welcome to your
injunction if you are willing to pay the cost that will be imposed on the infringer by adopting the
next best technological alternative. This removes the threat of shutdown from negotiations over
the patented technology, as well as any advantage that might come from ambushing competitors
who had unwittingly adopted a patented technology.
One might be concerned that the rule could create an incentive to infringe, as the worst
that could happen would be a subsidized change to the next best alternative technology if caught.
But the answer to this objection is that, in balancing the equities of a case, the rule should only
be deployed where there is evidence of innocent infringement on the one hand, or of ambush or
untoward bargaining leverage on the other. These are the kinds of criteria we use in deciding
whether the eBay rule should apply, and can equally well be used to help decide whether a
reverse liability rule is appropriate.
Then why not simply use the eBay rule; why add another possible outcome to patent
litigation, which some feel is already overly uncertain and expensive? The answer is that another
tool in the court’s kit of remedies allows it to better tailor outcomes to specific situations. In
particular, the reverse liability rule at least partially answers the objection that liability rules are
potentially inefficient because they impose a price set by an adjudicator who has imperfect
valuation information. The Spur Industries rule at least partially harnesses private valuation by
putting the patent holder back in the driver’s seat. The patent holder is given the choice whether
to pay the cost of the injunction or not; if the injunction is not worth the cost he can forgo it. The
rule therefore serves to separate the trolls from the innovators: those who really needed
exclusivity to establish a market for the product they were producing could assert their property
rights, but at a price. Trolls are allowed voluntarily segregate themselves from non-trolls, rather
than requiring a court to determine who is an NPE and who isn't.
Note also the corollary change in bargaining position of the alleged infringer. If the
intellectual property owner chooses damages, essentially a compulsory license, the infringer may
use the damage payment as a starting point for royalty negotiations; this type of bargaining is
common in cases of payments imposed by a third party adjudicator.12 The effects are even more
striking if the intellectual property holder chooses the injunction subject to a payment. The
infringer may now wish to negotiate a license, but rather than bargaining from an all or nothing
position, as he would be in the case of an injunction under a pure property rule, the infringer is
now bargaining from the starting point of receiving a damages payment. Even with the
injunction, the intellectual property owner, troll or otherwise, is no longer in the position of
holding the infringer up for the entire value of his business. In other words, the valuation and
bargaining range of the parties is now much narrower, making an agreement more likely. In
situations where the parties’ valuations would be very far apart, judicially narrowing the range
may facilitate private agreement.13
12
13

See Lemley, supra note 7.
See Burk, supra note 4 at 132.

6

Or, as a second example of where to use a reverse liability rule, imagine the application
of this rule in the context of controversies over patents in a standard-setting. Interoperation of
technological systems frequently requires some type of standardization; indeed, technologies
often tend toward a single standard.14 This means that there is often a “lock in” effect to
technical standards; unless a manufacturer adopts the standard, his product is marginalized.15
Access to and adoption of the standard, so that products are compatible with existing systems,
becomes essential to effectively compete in the market.
As a corollary, if a manufacturer holds intellectual property rights in a standard, those
rights can convey enormous market power. Indeed, adding intellectual property rights on top of
a technological standard seems often like piling on too much of a good thing. Because of this,
standard-setting organizations typically require disclosure of intellectual property interests by
their members when technological standards are being adopted.16 Patent owners are typically
required to reveal the presence of their patent, and agree that if their technology is adopted as the
standard, they will make licenses available on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms.17
There have been some occasions where a patent holder has failed to disclose his
proprietary interest in a technical standard, and perhaps has even willfully concealed his
proprietary interest until the standard has been adopted and is difficult to alter. Attempts to
enforce a patent against alleged infringers, who have adopted the patented standard under the
impression that it would be available on FRAND terms, raises difficult claims regarding fraud
and misrepresentation. A reverse liability rule seems almost tailor made to such a situation. A
court might say to the patent holder, fine, you are entitled to your injunction against those using
your technology -- but only if you are willing to pay the costs for those who have adopted the
standard and who wish to switch to an alternative. I suspect that this would deter most patent
holders from asserting their patents once the patented technology was adopted as a standard. But
those who truly wished to assert their exclusivity could do so, at a cost. The cost might be
considered an equitable or restitutionary penalty for not dealing openly in the first place.

Considering Calls and Puts
Rules 2 and 4 have some important characteristics that may not immediately be apparent
but that flow from the right to be paid. Under a liability rule, the entitlement holder might prefer
to obtain an injunction rather than a payment, but the injunction is not available. This effectively
means that the party that takes the asset can decide to do so, knowing that the penalty is to pay a
certain price under the liability rule. This entitlement structure closely parallels certain types of
financial instruments. Financial economists talk about "call" options, which are contracts that
14
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specify a certain price, called the exercise price, for future purchase of certain commodities. A
call option is in essence the right to buy at a specified price. The holder of the commodity may
not want to sell at that price at the time of the purchase, but the contract nonetheless allows the
buyer to force the sale at the price at the time he chooses within the terms specified by the
contract.
One can quickly see the parallel to a liability rule.18 A liability rule, such as a
compulsory license, effectively places the choice of whether to force an exchange into the hands
of the alleged infringer. The intellectual property holder may not wish to "sell" the rights at the
price specified by the compulsory license, but the statute or holding that animates the liability
rule leaves no choice: the intellectual property holder is entitled to receive payment, but may not
decline to sell. The same is of course true in the reverse liability rule situation; the home builder
can purchase the rights to be free of dust and stink at a specified price. The feed lot owner may
not want to move, to essentially sell those rights, but has no choice if the developer decides to
exercise the option to buy.
If Rules 3 and 4 are equivalent to call options, then the next logical extension of this
paradigm is to consider whether we might apply to intellectual property assets a different set of
options, complementary and reciprocal to call options, which in finance are called "put" options.
If a call option is the right to buy certain commodities at a certain price, then the put option is the
right to sell specified commodities at a certain price. The party under a put contract who holds
the right can force the other party to buy the asset at the exercise price, even if the other party
would prefer currently not to pay that price for the asset.
As in the case of liability “call” options, the put could be allocated to either party in a
dispute over an entitlement. In one case, the intellectual property owner could require the
infringer to buy the intellectual property, in the other case, the alleged infringer could require the
intellectual property owner to pay for exclusion. This gives us two new rules, Rule 5 and Rule 6.
Rule 5: the alleged infringer continues to use the intellectual property, but can choose to stop
infringing and receive damages from the intellectual property owner.
Rule 6: the intellectual property owner can enjoin the infringement, or can choose to waive the
injunction and instead collect damages from the infringer.
The addition of "put" rules to the picture adds an additional column to our matrix. Note
that the new rules are reciprocal to the previous liability rules. The right is still a right to be paid,
but the decision as to whether to force an exchange has been placed in the hands of the other
party vis a vis the corresponding liability rule. Here again the hope is to harness the private
information of the parties, by placing the choice of remedies into the hands of whichever party is
in the best position to make a private valuation that will align with the public interest.
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This entitlement structure is relatively rare compared to the other allocations in the table.
Property rules are of course well known and well established in law. Liability or "call" type
rules are also relatively well known in the law. "Put" type rules are less well known, but can be
identified if one knows what to look for. Ayres has identified several examples where this type
of rule is employed at common law, allowing an asset holder to essentially force a sale of the
particular asset.19
So for example, if Hilty steals my toothbrush, at common law, I can elect to sue either for
an injunction to force him to return the toothbrush, or alternatively for damages to force him to
pay me the value of the toothbrush.20 In other words, I have a choice whether to force him to
return the item he has taken or to pay me for it. It is fairly easy to see why I might want to have
the choice between the two remedies, particularly if I suspect that he may have been using the
toothbrush. In that case I may prefer the money over the restoration of the item. But the key
point is that I can make the choice, requiring him to in effect buy the item from me if I prefer that
outcome.
Similarly, if Hilty and I own adjacent parcels of land, and he builds a wall that extends
over my side of the property line, encroaching on my land, I can sue either for an injunction to
force him to tear down the wall, or in the alternative, I can sue to force him to pay me the value
19
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of the land on which the wall is situated.21 Again, I have the choice whether to recover the real
property or to receive a payment. In effect, I can force him to buy the land on which the wall is
situated if I prefer that outcome to recovering the land.

Advantages of Divided Entitlements
These type of asset allocations effectively create divided entitlements to the asset.
Property rights as traditionally formulated under Rules 1 and 2 are largely binary: one party
receives the entire allocation, the other party receives nothing. But under call and put type
allocations, each party receives something: either the right to possession of the asset, or the right
to alienate the asset and receive a payment.22 Giving each party a stake in the outcome, and
allowing the party with the most valuation information to choose the allocation of the respective
rights, tends to move the property to its best use in light of the events that have engendered the
cause of action. This also helps ameliorate the problems associated with bilateral monopolies.
Bilateral monopolies are known for producing a negotiating stand-off, where each party may try
to hold out for the full value of the entitlement. Dividing entitlements ensures that the fortunes
of the parties are tied together by the overlapping value of the shared entitlements, giving them
an incentive to move past a stand-off.23
This can be seen in familiar intellectual property allocations. Despite all the discussion
about patents and other intellectual property as strong, presumably unitary property rules,
divided entitlements are by no means unknown in intellectual property.24 Perhaps the best
known example is found in the doctrine of blocking patents where one party may hold a patent
covering a class of innovations, and another follow-on improver may simultaneously hold a
patent covering a specific improvement or sub-class covered by the broader patent. Such
improvers are effectively in a situation of bilateral monopoly; neither can exploit that particular
improvement without coming to terms with the other. This effectively divides the value of the
improvement between the two patent holders, and ensures that improvers always have some
incentive to develop existing technologies.25
Put- type options may be appropriate where an election might help to deter
counterproductive or in terrorem use of intellectual property rights. For example, imagine that
Hilty develops and markets an improvement to an existing widget. The holder of a patent to
such widgets sues Hilty, perhaps even obtaining a preliminary injunction against marketing the
improvement. Hilty ultimately prevails at trial, showing either that the underlying patent is
invalid or uninfringed – but by now the market opportunity for the device has passed, and even
though he is free to use the widget, all the latest models of the device use some other type of
widget. If given the Rule 5 option, Hilty might prefer to waive the right to continue using the
widget and instead collect damages from the patent owner for the sales that he would have made
had he been left in peace – in effect, forcing the patent owner to buy the improvement. In fact,
21
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under such circumstances, something like Rule 5 helps cure a version of the patent “troll”
problem.
Such “put” type option structures can also be seen in some types of administrative
programs. For example, this type of option is effectively built in to government programs to buy
back guns or to exchange dirty needles.26 Possessors of these items can in effect demand a
payment for a gun, or a new needle in exchange for an old needle. Such programs are intended
to get either guns or needles off the streets. We might ask ourselves whether put options could
equally well be used to get bad patents off the streets.
Our current method for getting bad patents off the streets involves a type of call option:
patent owners pay periodic maintenance fees to continue their period of exclusivity.27 A patent
owner who decides not to pay the fee ends the patent term early -- in other words, patent owners
can opt to buy additional increments of time on the patent. This is in essence a call option, the
right to buy additional time at a fixed price. A patent owner who decides that the patent is not
valuable enough to warrant the payment can allow the patent to lapse, taking the patent "off the
street."
Now imagine a different system, built around a put option. Under such a system, an
issued patent would be accompanied not by an option to purchase additional time, but by an
option to force the issuing authority -- the patent office -- to buy back the patent at a fixed price.
Some thought would need to go into setting the exact exercise price for the put, but I would
imagine that the price should be something less than the average cost of obtaining a patent, or
perhaps it would be some percentage, say 90% of the actual cost of obtaining the particular
patent in question. Suppose, just to pick a number, that the exercise price is set at 5000 Euros.
Now the patent owner knows that at any time she can assert the option to have the patent bought
back at 5000 Euros. If she estimates that the patent is worth at least 5000 Euros, she will keep it;
if she estimates it is worth less to her, she will sell it back. This removes patents that are
impractical or uninteresting or otherwise likely to be unworked.
This type of system may have additional advantages besides removing derelict patents
from the marketplace. An additional feature of a put-type option is the extra value that attaches
to the particular asset. The asset owner has not only the primary asset, but also the value of the
put -- indeed, under the right circumstances, the two can be monetized and traded separately; the
put itself can become a separate asset.28
In the case of intellectual property, where we frequently purport to create entitlements as
an incentive to invest in innovative or creative activity, the addition of a put to the underlying
entitlement may have interesting benefits. Because the put adds additional value to an
entitlement such as a patent, the owner may be willing to invest more.29 Additionally, attaching
a put to the basic entitlement places a definite and non-speculative asset into the hands of the
26
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patent owner. She always knows the patent is worth at least 5000 Euros. This may be helpful in
attracting outside investment. A portfolio of such patent puts could be advantageous in fostering
innovative start-ups and entrepreneurial initiatives. Indeed, the put need not be attached to
patents across the board, but might be confined to desirable industries that are particularly risky
or where it is difficult to attract investment.
Conclusion
I should be clear that I am not necessarily endorsing issuing patents subject to a put, or
even giving an alleged infringer who prevails at trial a damages remedy. Neither am I
necessarily endorsing reverse liability for non-practicing entities, although all these options seem
to me worth exploring. And this is of course precisely what I am endorsing: that we begin
looking for scenarios where alternative entitlement structures could be put to use. I have
confined myself here to a few examples involving patents, but the range of inquiry of course
ought to include other form of intellectual property such as copyright, trademark, trade secrecy
and industrial design. The range of diversity in intellectual property guarantees a variety of
situations in which alternative entitlement structures might be beneficial.
As Hilty and others have demonstrated, confining ourselves to exclusory rights is simply
not enough. Perhaps the most common trope regarding intellectual property is that it is property,
like real property, and should be treated as such.30 Unfortunately, this usually means treating it
according to a very narrow ideological approach to exclusivity. Taking the rhetoric about
“property” at face value, I hold that we should rather open intellectual property to the full range
of entitlement structures that have evolved to accommodate myriad different asset allocations.31
I have shown in other work with Mark Lemley that technology is diverse, the innovation profiles
of different industries are diverse, and that only a panoply of diverse incentive mechanisms can
be expected to foster innovation in these many different environments.32 Greater attention to
compulsory licenses and related allocative rules adds to the kit of legal tools available to
accomplish such goals.
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